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very important subject of inequitable conduct reform in this
Symposium. And I'd particularly like to commend them for their
impeccable timing; this Symposium is being held on the Friday
before oral arguments in the Federal Circuit's en banc rehearing of
the inequitable conduct issues in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson and Co.'
As many of you know, it has been over twenty years since the
Federal Circuit last convened en banc to address the inequitable
conduct doctrine in Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v.
Hollister Inc.2 At that time, Judge Nichols had just uttered his
now-famous rant, calling the doctrine an "absolute plague." 3
Echoes of the cry of "plague" have been heard with increasing
frequency in recent years, ultimately leading the Federal Circuit to
agree to a wholesale en banc reconsideration of the doctrine of
inequitable conduct. 4 My remarks today will be divided into four
main parts. First, I will provide a little background on the
substantive requirements of the doctrine of inequitable conduct.
Second, I will discuss some of the doctrinal incongruities that have
led to the current cry for reform. Third, I will discuss the Federal
Circuit's en banc questions in Therasense,6 and will discuss some
of the positions taken by the nearly three dozen amici curiae who
filed briefs at the merits-rehearing stage of Therasense.7 Finally, I
would like to briefly address one issue that has lurked at the
periphery of the inequitable conduct doctrine-the place of patent
prosecution counsel in litigation where inequitable conduct is
alleged.

Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
2
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
4
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 374 F. App'x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(granting en banc review).
I will spare you a recitation of the doctrine's historical roots, which can be found in
Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37 (1993).
6
Therasense, 374 F. App'x at 35.

See infra notes 91-100. For a list of the briefs see Dennis Crouch, Therasense v.
BD: Briefs on the Merits, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 7, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2010/08/therasense-briefs-enbanc.html.
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BACKGROUND ON SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

Inequitable conduct is a judge-made affirmative defense to
patent infringement.8 When it succeeds, it has the effect of
rendering unenforceable not just the patent claims impacted by the
conduct at issue, but the entire patent-and sometimes other,
related patents as well. 9 This powerful remedy makes it a popular
choice among patent infringement defendants, who have a strong
incentive to scour the inventor's files and the patent prosecutor's
files for anything that wasn't disclosed to the United States Patent
and Trademark Office ("USPTO") during prosecution.
Inequitable conduct is also a popular defense because of the
litigation narrative it provides. A patentee will often offer the jury
a motherhood, apple pie and Thomas Edison story about how the
inventor overcame tremendous obstacles and sacrificed much to
bring the world this wonderful invention-which defendants have
now stolen. The other main defenses in a patent casenoninfringement and invalidity'0 -- are typically quite technical,
and often don't provide good human dramas to engage the jury.
By contrast, inequitable conduct allows the accused infringer to
say, in effect, "Everything you just heard about motherhood, apple
pie, Thomas Edison and the plaintiff-inventor is bunk. The truth
is, he tricked your government into giving him monopoly rights
over a valuable technology, rights that he didn't deserve."
I should note that in so characterizing the utility of the
inequitable conduct defense, I don't intend to make an empirical
claim about how widespread such deceit is in practice before the
USPTO-though I do suspect that the ongoing rise in popularity of

See Goldman, supra note 5, at 52-67. But see David Hricik & Seth Trimble,
Congratulationson Your Hallucinations: Why the PTO's 1992 Amendment to § 1.56 is
Irrelevant to Inequitable Conduct, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 1 (2010); see also Amicus Brief of
Professor David Hricik in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson and Co., Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595 (2010), 2010 WL
3390224.
9

U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE

§ 2016 (8th ed. Rev. 7, Sept. 2008) [hereinafter MPEP].
'o 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
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the defense" is not due to a correspondingly dramatic rise in
dishonest conduct before the Patent Office. The fact that the
overall ratio of Federal Circuit rulings of inequitable conduct to
patent cases filed in the district courts has remained relatively
steady over the years 12 is some indication that the rise in use of the
defense may be due to its value in litigation, rather than due to a
rise in bad conduct before the USPTO.
So how does someone go about proving inequitable conduct?
Historically, there are three elements: materiality, intent and
balancing.13 Each of these elements must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.14
Although inequitable conduct is an
equitable doctrine, judges have historically been afforded no
discretion to impose remedies other than the single remedy of
unenforceability of the entire patent.' 5
The first element for proving inequitable conduct is materiality.
The information involved must be material to patentability.' 6
Typically this is information that is withheld from or not disclosed
to the USPTO during prosecution.17 For example, a key piece of
prior art may not have been disclosed to the examiner. Material
information may also be false information presented to the Patent
Office.' 8 For example, if someone lies about scientific test results
that are reported to the patent examiner.
There are a couple of tests that are traditionally applied to
determine if the information was material.19 Although there are

1 See Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the "Plague": Reforming the Doctrine of
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1358-60 (2004) (displaying a chart
showing the steady increase in assertions of the defense).
12 Id. at 1352.
13 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 593 F.3d 1289,
1300 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (quoting Pharmacia Corp. v Par Pharm., Inc., 417 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
14

Id.

15 See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560-62 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
16 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2011); Digital Control, Inc. v. The Charles Mach. Works,
437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
17 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2011).
18 See id.
19 Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315 (explaining the objective "but for" standard, the
subjective "but for" test, and the "but it may have" standard); see also Coming Glass
Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461, 469-70 (D. Del. 1966).
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actually more than this, I would like to focus on the main three
tests.
There is a "but for" materiality test that essentially says "the
materiality is determined if that information would render the
patent invalid., 20 This is considered to be the highest standard for
materiality, in the sense that the standard is expected to result in
the least amount of information being found material.2 '
There is another test, referred to as the 1992 version of Rule
56,22 that is a somewhat lower threshold. Under the 1992 version
of Rule 56, information is material if it presents a prima facie case
of invalidity, not considering any rebuttal arguments.23 This
means that when you first look at the information, it appears to
invalidate one or more of the pending claims. The applicant could
have a good argument or explanation about why it doesn't actually
invalidate the claims. But, you don't consider these arguments, or
even the existence of these arguments, in determining materiality
under the 1992 version of Rule 56. Thus, this test is kind of in the
ballpark of invalidity but broader than actual invalidity. If it were
strictly limited to invalidity, the test for materiality would take into
account those counterarguments as to why the prior art does not, in
But since it ignores those
fact, invalidate the claims.
the
Rule
56
test
for materiality includes more
counterarguments,
prior art than just that which would invalidate the claims. There is
also an additional requirement to this test. To be material,
information must be non-cumulative with information that is

Corning, 253 F. Supp. at 469-70; see also Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1315
(describing "the objective 'but for' standard, where the misrepresentation was so material
that the patent should not have issued").
21
Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.3d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970); see also 1 DONALD S.
20

CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS

§

19.03 (2011) (describing the "but for" test as "strict").

Duty to disclose information material to patentability, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992).
23
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) ("A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the
information compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of
evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest reasonable
construction consistent with the specification, and before any consideration is given to
evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of
patentability.").
22
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already before the examiner. 24 In other words, let's suppose there
are two equally good prior art references, let's call them Reference
A and Reference B. They do an equally good job of disclosing
some piece of prior art knowledge. Let's further assume that the
applicant only disclosed one of them-Reference A-to the
examiner. Under those circumstances, it would not be a violation
of the duty of disclosure to fail to disclose Reference B, because it
is said to be cumulative of Reference A (which was disclosed).
Then the third test I'd like to discuss is called the "reasonable
examiner" test. It asks: Would a reasonable examiner consider this
information important in deciding whether to issue a patent? 25
This test was written into the USPTO's Rule 56 in 1977, and was
the rule from 1977 until the rule was amended in 1992. It is
considered the broadest standard for materiality.2 6 It is also the
least objective of the standards, when applied in litigation. Actual
patent examiners (reasonable or not) are prohibited by regulation
from testifying about patent examinations, 27 and the test is framed
in the hypothetical subjunctive: "Would a reasonable examiner

Id ("Under this section, information is material to patentability when it is not
cumulative to information already of record or being made of record in the application . .
24

37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977) ("Such information is material where there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding
whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.").
26
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (while discussing the 1977 version of Rule 56, the court stated "The PTO
'standard' is an appropriate starting point for any discussion of materiality, for it appears
to be the broadest, thus encompassing the others and because that materiality boundary
most closely aligns with how one ought to conduct business with the PTO."); see also
Digital Control, Inc. v. The Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
27
Demand for Testimony or Production of Documents, 37 C.F.R. § 104.22 (2008)
(prohibiting testimony by PTO employees without General Counsel's approval); USPTO
Expert or Opinion Testimony, 37 C.F.R. § 104.23 (2008) (prohibiting expert or opinion
testimony by PTO employees without General Counsel's approval); MPEP § 1701, supra
note 9 (prohibiting testimony and opinions concerning, inter alia, patent enforceability);
W. Elec. Co. v. Piezo Tech., Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 430-31 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the
reasonable examiner test is "an objective standard," so testimony of examiners who
examined patent-in-suit was "irrelevant to the issue of inequitable conduct" and noting
"the general rule . . . that a patent examiner cannot be compelled to testify regarding his
'mental processes' in reaching a decision on a patent application").
25
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have wanted this information?" 28 This determination is to be made
by the district court judge, who more than likely has never served
as a patent examiner, and may have never even met a patent
examiner. But these judges are called upon to determine what the
hypothetical reasonable patent examiner would have wanted to
know. And there are no bright-line tests about the kinds of
information that could satisfy this test.
All three of these tests, but-for materiality, Rule 56, and the
reasonable examiner, are in play as we talk about Therasense and
the Federal Circuit's en banc consideration of the defense.
Let's turn now to the second major element of inequitable
conduct-intent. Broadly speaking, the question raised by the
intent element is whether the material information was withheld
with the intent of deceiving the patent examiner.29 As you might
imagine, direct evidence that proves intent to deceive the USPTO
is something that is often very difficult to prove. There is rarely
that litigator's dream memo that says, "Ha, let's trick the Patent
Office by withholding this information," or "I totally made up
those test results so we can report them to the Patent Office and get
this patent issued." So there is a lot of discussion about how to
prove intent to deceive.
And there is widespread
acknowledgement that we will have to rely largely on
circumstantial evidence.3 0
The Federal Circuit has articulated a number of tests that say
what evidence is enough to prove intent. Historically, before
Kingsdown, one of the leading tests was a "gross negligence"
test. 3 1 But Kingsdown, in the en banc portion of the decision, held

W. Elec. Co., 860 F.2d at 433 ("Information is material where 'there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to
allow the application to issue as a patent."' (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a))).
29
Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citing Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1439 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)).
30
Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Bruno
Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
31
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing
Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see Kingsdown
28
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that "a finding that particular conduct amounts to 'gross
negligence' does not of itself justify an inference of intent to
deceive."32 There was another test in use at about the same time,
the "should have known" test, which held that intent could be
found if the applicant should have known of the materiality of the
information it withheld. 33 In a case that pre-dated both Burlington
and Kingsdown, the Federal Circuit equated these two terms,
holding that gross negligence (the standard rejected in Kingsdown)
could be shown where the applicant reasonably should have known
of the materiality of the undisclosed information. 34
A funny thing has happened in the years since Kingsdown. The
two concepts are still related, but their relationship has inverted.
Rather than using "should have known" to prove "gross
negligence," as was done in 1984 in J.P. Stevens, more recent
cases have used "gross negligence" to prove "should have
known." 35 Was this shift intended to be an end-run around
Kingsdown 's disapproval of "gross negligence"? It's hard to say,
but it has definitely spawned a fair amount of uncertainty within
the intent prong of the inequitable conduct defense.
To make matters more confusing, as part of the "should have
known" inquiry, the courts have taken into account the degree of
materiality as circumstantial evidence of whether it was withheld
with intent to deceive.36 In other words, "this information was
really, really material, so you really, really should have known that
you needed to disclose it to the examiner, and in that context, your
failure to disclose such material evidence is evidence that you must

Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(the court did not apply the "gross negligence" test for intent).
32 Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
3
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed Cir. 1988) (citing
FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
34 J.P. Stevens & Co., 747 F.2d at 1560, 1567.
3
E.g., Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citing Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253,
1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
36 See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting
Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2005)).
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have intended to deceive the examiner." 37 Sometimes, though, the
courts have tried to back off a bit from this rule, saying that
materiality alone cannot be used to prove intent; that there must be
some other evidence to help prove intent.
And in this context, the courts look to the patentee and the
patentee's attorney to provide a reasonable good faith explanation
for the non-disclosure. That is, the burden of proof shifts to the
patentee to prove that it didn 't intend to deceive the examiner.39
In 2008, Chief Judge Michel wrote a lengthy opinion that
appeared to be an effort to "reset" the intent element. In Star
Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,4 0 the court articulated
a "single most reasonable inference" test, saying: "if we look at all
the evidence and the single most reasonable inference that we can
draw from that evidence is an intent to deceive, then we can find
intent to deceive."41 In other words, you can't prove intent to a
clear and convincing standard of proof merely by demonstrating
that one plausible inference from the evidence is that the patentee
should have known of the materiality of non-disclosed
information. Judge Michel's careful articulation was roundly
ignored in the next inequitable conduct decision to come out of the
Federal Circuit.4 2
We have now covered the two main elements of inequitable
conduct. If those are both found by clear and convincing evidence,
the court is supposed to go through a balancing step, saying, in

E.g., BarLabs., 437 F.3d at 1191 (citing Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1257 ("a high level of
materiality and clear proof that it knew or should have known of that materiality .. . [will
make] it difficult to establish 'subjective good faith . . . .') (internal citation omitted).
38 M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., 439 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
39
Id. ("Intent is generally inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the
applicant's overall conduct, especially where there is no good faith explanation for a
nondisclosure. . . . [J]ust as a good faith explanation can be presented as evidence to
refute an inference of intent, and usually is so presented, the absence of such an
explanation can constitute evidence to support a finding of intent.").
40
537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
41 See id. at 1366.
42
See Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1316-18 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming
district court's finding that applicants knew or should have known about material nonpublic information).
37
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effect: "Taking into account this materiality and this proof of
intent, is this conduct so egregious as to find inequitable
conduct?" 43 If so, the patent is deemed unenforceable. Quite often
*
44
that step is minimized or ignored in the case law.
As I mentioned earlier, right now the only remedy is
unenforceability of the whole patent. One of the things that are on
the table now is whether we should broaden the range of available
remedies to some lesser remedies as part of the doctrine.
II.

RECENT CASES AND DOCTRINAL INCONGRUITIES

Now I'd like to give a little bit more recent historical context.
The "reasonable examiner" standard for materiality was
something that was originally articulated by the USPTO in the late
1970s. 4 5 At that time, the USPTO had an internal disciplinary
body, sometimes referred to as the "Fraud Squad," 46 where they
would investigate allegations of inequitable conduct internally.
The Patent Office shut down the Fraud Squad in the 1980s because
they determined that they were not competent institutionally to
make determinations of intent. 4 7 So adjudication of this issue got
left to the courts.
In the late 1980s was the Burlington case, in which the court
first referred to inequitable conduct as a "plague."
The same year as Burlington was the Kingsdown decision.
That was the last time that the Federal Circuit convened en banc to
address inequitable conduct. In the en banc portion of the

Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
("Once threshold findings of materiality and intent are established, the trial court must
weigh them to determine whether the equities warrant a conclusion that inequitable
conduct occurred.").
4
See Praxair,543 F.3d at 1313.
45
37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977).
46
Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., Evolution and Future of New Rule 56 and the Duty of
Candor: The Evolution and Issue ofNew Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 136, 139 (1992).
43

47

See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF

PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
139.

§ 2010 (6th ed. Jan. 1995); Manbeck, supra note 46, at

2011] REVISITING THE DOCTRINE OFINEQUITABLE CONDUCT

1017

Kingsdown decision, the court held that "gross negligence" alone
cannot be used to prove intent.
Shortly after that, the USPTO issued the 1992 version of Rule
56, changing the rule for materiality from the "reasonable
examiner" test to one that required the primafacie case standard of
materiality as described above.
So fast-forward from 1992 until 2006 or so. There was sort of
an assumption that the "reasonable examiner" standard would fade
into irrelevance and we would move forward with Rule 56. For a
time, inequitable conduct for patents that had been prosecuted
before 1992 was considered under the "reasonable examiner"
standard, and for patents prosecuted after 1992, the new version of
Rule 56 was applied. But that all got upended in 2006 when a
couple of cases stirred up the doctrine.
In Digital Control, Inc. v. The Charles Machine Works,48 the
Federal Circuit held that all of the standards that have ever been
articulated for materiality are all still valid and on the table. This
includes the but-for standard, the 1992 version of Rule 56 and the
"reasonable examiner" standard. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
"reasonable examiner" test, the lowest, broadest threshold, is still
used in the vast majority of cases.
Within a couple of weeks of Digital Control, the Federal
Circuit also decided the FerringB. V v. Barr Laboratories,Inc.49
In Ferring, the trial court granted summary judgment of
inequitable conduct based on proof of intent through a "should
have known" standard.5 0 The patent applicant had been required to
provide declarations from scientific experts during prosecution of
the patent. Although there was no suggestion that the information
provided by those scientific experts was in any way inaccurate or
flawed, some (but not all) of the experts failed to disclose that they
had previously had financial ties to the patent-applicant
company.5 Because the applicant "should have known" that the
examiner would have wanted to know about these financial ties,
48

4'
50

"

437 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 1185.
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the court concluded that the nondisclosure was done with intent to
deceive the examiner. 52
In 2008, in an opinion by Chief Judge Michel in the Star
Scientific case, the court set forth an attempted comprehensive
restatement of the doctrine, including the articulation of the "single
most reasonable inference" standard for intent, and there was some
thought that the standard would take hold.5 3 But just a few weeks
after, a different panel of the Federal Circuit completely ignored
StarScientific.54
Then, in 2009, the Federal Circuit decided Exergen Corp. v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 5 articulating a heightened fraud-like
pleading standard under Rule 9(b). The jury is still out on whether
that is going to have any impact on the doctrine.
This is obviously an incomplete list of the noteworthy recent
cases. Many others are worth discussing. One, perhaps, deserves
at least a brief mention. The McKesson Information Solutions, Inc.
v. Bridge Medical, Inc. case56 is often cited by patent prosecution
It requires
counsel as sending shivers down their spines.
57
of any
but
also
disclosure not only of the prior art references,
Patent Office rejections in copending applications, even when one
copending application is only generally similar to the other one.
This quick summary of cases should suffice to provide a contextual
setting for the Therasense en banc review.
III. THE EN BANC ORDER AND AMICus BRIEFS

For at least the past five years, parties on the losing end of the
inequitable conduct issue have been petitioning the Federal Circuit

52
5

Id. at 1191-94.

Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
54
See Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
1
575 F.3d 1312, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
56
487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
s Id at 923.
Id. at 924.
58
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for en banc review. 59 But the Federal Circuit repeatedly turned
down the petitions for en banc review in each of those cases.60
Then, somehow, Therasense won the en banc lottery. Was
there something special about the facts of this case, or was the time
just ripe for en banc review? Beyond speculation, it's hard to say
what was behind the Federal Circuit's vote to go en banc.
In Therasense, the district court found inequitable conduct, and
the Federal Circuit panel decision affirmed in a 2-1 decision.
Judge Linn filed a lengthy dissent.6 ' When one reads the majority
and dissenting opinions, it's kind of hard to believe they're talking
about the same case. Their accounts of the facts are just starkly
different. I'll try to provide a summary of the facts that is as
consistent as possible with both versions of the facts.
The patent-in-suit in Therasense was U.S. Patent No.
5,820,551 for ("the '551 Patent") technology related to blood
glucose test strips. 62 The prosecution history for the '551 Patent
was a long and tortured process. At some point, another patent,
coincidentally another Abbott patent, U.S. Patent No. 4545382
("the '382 Patent") was cited as prior art during prosecution of the

'551 Patent. 63
The applicant for the '551 Patent made arguments about why
the '382 Patent should be distinguished from the '551 Patent.
Well, it turned out that the European counterpart to the prior art
'382 Patent had been subjected to revocation proceedings in
5
See Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Ferring, B.V.
v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., No. 05-1284 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 1, 2006), 2006 WL 1032932;
Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Aventis Pharma S.A.
v. Amphastar Pharm. Inc., No. 2007-1280 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 27, 2008), 2008 WL 2761591;
Combined Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Star Scientific Inc. v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 2007-1448 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 8, 2008), 2008 WL 4381911;
Petition for Rehearing En Banc of Taltech Ltd. v. Esquel Apparel, Inc., No. 2009-1344
(Fed. Cir. Jun. 11, 2010), 2010 WL 2649927.
60 Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Star Scientific, Inc.
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Taltech Ltd. v. Esquel
Enters., Ltd., 604 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
61
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1312-25 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (Linn, J., dissenting).
62
Id. at 1293.
63 Id. at 1294.
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Europe.64 And during those proceedings, an argument had been
made about why the European counterpart to the '382 Patent was
patentable. That argument included the sentence, "Optionally, but
preferably, when being used on live blood, a protective membrane
surrounds both the enzyme and the mediator layers, permeable to
water and glucose molecules." 65 The question was whether the
membrane was optional or required. In the European proceedings,
it appeared to have been argued that this sentence meant that the
membrane was optional.66 During prosecution of the '551 Patent,
by contrast, it appeared to have been argued that the sentence
meant it was required.67
The applicant for the '551 Patent made an argument to the
examiner, characterizing the '382 Patent. The argument was
arguably inconsistent with a statement made to the European
Patent Office ("EPO") during the revocation proceedings
concerning the '382 Patent.68 And the applicant for the '551 Patent
did not disclose the statement that had been made to the EPO.
It was this non-disclosure, which the district court found to
have been done with intent to deceive the examiner, that formed
the basis for the inequitable conduct finding. The intent finding
was based largely on the materiality of the information and the
district court's determination of the credibility of the attorney who
prosecuted the patent. 69
Judge Linn wrote a lengthy dissent. He argued that the
majority erred on both the materiality and intent prongs of the
analysis.70 For materiality, he provided an interpretation of the key
language that would harmonize the various interpretations of the
"optionally, but preferably" language. 7 He similarly found fault
with the district court's analysis of intent. 72
"

65
66
67
68
69

70
71
72

Id at 1300.
Id. at 1295 (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,545,382 col.4 11.63-66 (issued Oct. 18, 1985)).
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1296-97.
Id at 1300-01.
Id. at 1306-07.
Id. at 1312-24 (Linn, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1313-15.
Id. at 1319-24.
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One of the tricky things about this case that hasn't gotten a lot
of air play is how close it is to the exception-for-attorney
argument.7 3 When an attorney is merely arguing about the
meaning of prior art or other information that is before the patent
office, the zealous, even erroneous, arguments of counsel cannot
form the basis for an inequitable conduct finding. 74 But here, the
theory goes, it wasn't just attorney argument. There was another
document-the submission to the European Patent Office (which
also contained attorney argument)-that wasn't disclosed to the
examiner.7 5
As I mentioned, the Federal Circuit issued a 2-1 panel decision,
finding inequitable conduct. Abbott petitioned for en banc review,
and the Federal Circuit voted to grant en banc review. But the
Order granting en banc review included a list of 7uestions that
went way beyond the narrow decision in this case. The court's
questions indicated a willingness to grant a wholesale
reconsideration to, and perhaps revision of, the doctrine of
inequitable conduct. There were six questions in the en banc
Order.7 7 They're listed below, and I've underlined the key
concepts in each question:
1. Should the materiality-intent-balancing framework
for inequitable conduct be modified or replaced?
2. If so, how? In particular, should the standard be tied
directly to fraud or unclean hands? .... If so, what
is the appropriate standard for fraud or unclean
hands?
3. What is the proper standard for materiality? What
role should [USPTO rules] play in defining
materiality? Should a finding of materiality require
that but for the alleged misconduct, one or more
claims would not have issued?

7

Id. at 1305 (majority).

74

Id. at 1305.

75

Id.

Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 374 F. App'x 35 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(order granting en banc review).
77
Id. at 35-36.
76
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4. Under what circumstances is it proper to infer intent
from materiality?
5. Should the balancing inquiry (balancing materiality
and intent) be abandoned?
6. Whether the standards for materiality and intent in
other federal agency contexts or at common law
shed light on the appropriate standards to be applied
in the patent context.
These questions have spawned a lot of interest in the case. In
addition to the parties' briefs, there have been almost three dozen
amicus briefs submitted to the Federal Circuit from a wide range of
industry, academics, law firms, practicing lawyers, and bar
associations. The positions advanced by amici are all over the
map. Let me try to summarize in broad generalities some of the
things that can be gleaned from the amicus briefs.
The amicus briefs included a dozen filed by companies,79 nine
by bar association groups, five by industry groups, three by
78

Id.
In alphabetical order: Acacia Research Corporation, Apotex, Dolby, Ecore, Eisai,
Intel, Johnson & Johnson (and Procter & Gamble), Ole Nilssen, Sanofi-Aventis (and
Microsoft), SAP, Teva (and Cisco and the Generic Pharmaceutical Association) and
Verizon. See Brief for Acacia Research Corp. and 1st Media, LLC as Amici Curiae in
Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter
Acacia]; Brief for Apotex Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Therasense,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos.
2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter Apotex]; Brief for Dolby Labs., Inc.
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and
Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,
-1595) [hereinafter Dolby]; Brief for Ecore Int'l LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter Ecore];
Brief for Eisai Co., Ltd. and Eisai Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter Eisai]; Brief for Intel
Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512,
-1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter Intel]; Brief for Johnson & Johnson and Procter &
Gamble Co. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512,
-1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter Johnson & Johnson]; Brief for Ole K. Nilssen and Geo
Found., Ltd. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Therasense, Inc. v.
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Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 20081511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter Ole Nilssen]; Brief for Sanofi-Aventis and
Microsoft Corp. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Therasense, Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 20081511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter Sanofi-Aventis]; Brief for SAP Am., Inc.
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and
Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,
-1595) [hereinafter SAP]; Brief for Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Defendants-Appellees, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter
Teva]; Brief for Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter Verizon].
80
American Bar Association, San Diego IP Law Association, AIPLA, Federal Circuit
Bar Association, Boston Patent Law Association, Houston IP Law Association, IP Law
Association of Chicago, Washington State Patent Law Association, Conejo Valley Bar
Association. See Brief for Am. Bar Ass'n. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter ABA]; Brief for San
Diego Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter SDIPLA]; Brief for
Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter AIPLA]; Brief for Fed.
Cir. Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512,
-1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter FCBA]; Brief for Bos. Patent Law Ass'n as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595)
[hereinafter BPLA]; Brief for Hous. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n as Anicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter
HIPLA]; Brief for Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n of Chi. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter
IPLAC]; Brief for Wash. State Patent Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter WSPLA]; Brief for
Conejo Valley Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc.
v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 20081511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter CVBA].
81
BIO, IPO, PhRma, International IP Institute, and Association of Citizens for Patent
Protection in the Public Interest. See Brief for Biotechnology Indus. Org. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595)
[hereinafter BIO]; Brief for IP Owners Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
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groups of individual lawyers, 82 three by academics, and one by
the USPTO. 84 Most of the industry-related briefs took fairly
predictable positions. For example, Apotex, a generic drug
manufacturer, essentially argued that the doctrine should be kept as
it is. In particular, Apotex argued that information affecting any
aspect of patentability should be permitted to satisfy a low bar for
materiality." Apotex's brief represents one end of the spectrum,
Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter IPOA]; Brief for
Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter PhRma]; Brief for Int'l
Intellectual Prop. Inst. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Therasense,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos.
2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter IIPI]; Brief for Ass'n of Citizens for
Patent Protection in the Pub. Interest as Amicus Curiae in Support of DefendantsAppellees, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) (Fed. Cir. argued Nov. 9,
2010) [hereinafter ACPPPI].
82
22 Patent Prosecutors, 43 Patent Prosecutors at Eli Lilly, and Patterson Thuente. See
Brief of 22 Patent Prosecution Firms and Practitioners as Amici Curiae Supporting
Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter 22
Patent Prosecution Firms]; Brief of 43 Patent Practitioners Employed by Eli Lilly and Co.
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and
Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,
-1595) [hereinafter 43 Eli Lilly Patent Practitioners]; Brief of Patterson Thuente Christian
Pedersen P.A. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512,
-1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter Patterson Thuente].
83 IP Law Professors, David Hricik, and the University of Akron Center for IP Law.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Prop. Law Professors Concerning En Banc Review
of Inequitable Conduct and in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512,
-1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter IP Law Professors]; Amicus Brief of Professor David
Hricik in Support of Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595)
[hereinafter David Hricik].
84
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of
Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter United
States].
Apotex, supra note 79, at 12-15 (noting that "several standards" for determining
materiality exist, and that courts should accept and employ one or more of them in a
given case, depending on the context).
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an entity that is essentially always on the defense, and never on the
side of enforcing patents. On the other end of the spectrum,
Acacia Research Corporation, sometimes uncharitably referred to
as a "patent troll," argued for the abolition of the defense.8 6 This is
similar typecasting: Acacia is virtually always in the position of
enforcing patents, and not a patent infringement defendant. The
Intellectual Property Owners' Association ("IPO") similarly
argued not for abolition of the defense, but for a high standard. 87
The USPTO, of course, argued for more deference to Rule 56 as a
standard for materiality, arguing that it is in the best position to
know what information the USPTO itself needs to conduct
examination. The various patent prosecution attorneys who filed
briefS89 emphasized their desire for bright-line rules and high
thresholds. 90 Most of the companies, industry organizations, and
bar associations, which represent more mixed sets of interests, took
more nuanced positions.91

Acacia, supra note 79, at 12-15.
IPOA, supra note 81, at 2, 4-11 ("IPO believes that inequitable conduct should be
based on clear and convincing evidence that the applicant intended to deceive the USPTO
into issuing an invalid claim.").
88 Brief of the United States Patent and Trademark Office as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 8-17, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595)
(arguing that "[t]he single proper standard for materiality should be Rule 56" and that the
other four standards are "less than optimal") [hereinafter USPTO].
89 E.g., 43 Eli Lilly Patent Practitioners, supra note 82; 22 Patent Prosecution Firms,
supra note 82.
90
43 Eli Lilly Patent Practitioners, supra note 82, at 3-4, 7-11 ("Pleadings of
unenforceability based upon culpable misconduct before the Office should be permitted
only when they can particularize a nefarious scheme or plan that is or amounts to a fraud.
. . . "); 22 Patent Prosecution Firms, supra note 82, at 1-2, 5-10 ("The materiality-intentbalancing framework for inequitable conduct should be replaced with clear standards"
because the doctrine "makes it too easy to establish deceptive intent where none exists.").
91 E.g., SAP, supra note 79, at 12 ("there can be no hard and fast rules suitable for
every case of inequitable conduct. . . ."); SDIPLA, supra note 80, at 12-13 (advocating
the remedy of unenforceability only when the "but-for" test is met and a remedy of lesser
sanctions for less-offensive conduct); IPLAC, supra note 80, at 17-28 ("The Court
should consider whether inequitable conduct jurisprudence should, even in the presence
of inequitable conduct, always completely bar all remedies, or whether instead it should
be directed more carefully to the doing of equity. Not all equitable defenses, even
considering only patent defenses, provide complete bars to relief.").
86
87
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Of those taking a position on the materiality standard, nearly
half argued for some version of an objective but-for test for
materiality. 92 About half as many argued for adoption of the
Fewer still argued for the
current (1992) version of Rule 56.
status quo "reasonable examiner" standard.94
On the issue of intent, there was strong support for the idea of
requiring proof of "specific intent,"95 and also fairly strong support
for requiring proof of intent that was independent from materiality.
There was, however, some split of opinion as to whether the proof
of intent should be completely independent from materiality, 9 6 or
just some independent proof (echoing the en banc decision in
Kingsdown), leaving ambiguity as to whether materiality could
supply some of the inferential evidence of intent. 97 Several briefs
also expressed support for the Star Scientific "single most
reasonable inference" test. 98
Not many amici weighed in on the balancing test, but those
who did were roughly evenly split on whether to keep99 or
abolishoo the balancing test.
92 Those who advocated a "but-for" standard were 43 Eli Lilly Patent Practitioners,
supra note 82, at 13-14; ABA, supra note 80, at 16-18 ("in the absence of such
misrepresentation or omission, the PTO, acting reasonably, would not have granted or
maintained in force at least one patent claim . . . ."); AIPLA, supra note 80, at 15-17;
BIO, supra note 81, at 21-23; BPLA, supra note 80, at 14-16; Eisai, supra note 79, at 27; Ecore, supra note 79, at 2-10; IIPI, supra note 81, at 8-10; IPOA, supra note 81, at 911; PhRMA, supra note 81, at 15-19; David Hricik, supra note 83, at 18-19; SDIPLA,
supranote 80, at 12; WSPLA, supranote 80, at 15.
9
See IP Law Professors, supra note 83; FCBA, supra note 80, at 3; HIPLA, supra
note 80; SDIPLA, supra note 80; Ole Nilssen, supra note 79 at 4; United States, supra
note 84, at 3.
94 See Apotex, supra note 79, at 12; Intel, supra note 79, at 3; Teva, supra note 79, at
9.
9
See, e.g., BIO, supra note 81, at 15; ABA, supra note 80, at 1; AIPLA, supra note
80, at 2; USPTO, supra note 88, at 3-4; PhRma, supra note 81, at 23; Eisai, supra note
79, at 14; Sanofi-Aventis, supranote 79, at 14-15.
9
See, e.g., IP Law Professors, supra note 83; SDIPLA, supra note 80, at 5; HIPLA,
supra note 80, at 11; 43 Eli Lilly Patent Practitioners, supra note 82, at 3; Patterson
Thuente, supra note 82.
97 See, e.g., BIO, supra note 81, at 24; ABA, supra note 80, at 18; AIPLA, supra note
80, at 2; USPTO, supra note 88, at 22; Apotex, supra note 79, at 23.
98 See, e.g., IP Law Professors, supra note 83; FCBA, supra note 80, at 19.
See, e.g., FCBA, supra note 80, at 19; USPTO, supra note 88, at 25; IPOA, supra
9
note 81, at 14; Apotex, supra note 79, at 9.
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IV. PATENT PROSECUTION PERSPECTIVE

These amicus briefs contain a lot of terrific, nuanced, carefully
crafted arguments. There's way more material than I would be
able to address in these short remarks. So I will have to limit
myself to one particular perspective: What is the most workable
standard from the perspective of patent prosecution counsel? If we
assume that most patent prosecution counsel would prefer to
prosecute valid and enforceable patents for their clients, what
standard will best enable that ethical majority to comply with their
desires and ethical obligations?
On the materiality front, it is tempting to say the standard
should be ratcheted up as high as possible. That is, to the but-for
materiality standard. But there are a couple of problems with this.
First, the standard, as articulated by the Federal Circuit, is actually
a bit ambiguous. It provides, "but-for the failure to disclose the
information, the patent would not have issued."' 0 ' That may (or
may not) be different from what many amici imagined as a
standard imposing a duty of disclosure only for information that
actually invalidates the patent under sections 35 U.S.C. § 102 or
§ 103.102 But, even assuming that it's limited to § 102- or § 103type invalidating prior art, there are two more problems with the
but-for standard. First, it would create a Catch-22 for patent
prosecutors. If prior art actually invalidates the claims, they should
not issue; therefore, disclosure of prior art under this standard is an
admission that it invalidates one or more claims under prosecution.
But if the prior art doesn't invalidate the claims, then there is no
duty to disclose it. Second, the but-for standard depends on actual
invalidity, which is something that isn't finally adjudicated until
litigation.

100 See, e.g., BIO, supra note 81, at 27; IP Law Professors, supra note 83; SDIPLA,
supra note 80, at 6; 43 Eli Lilly Patent Practitioners, supra note 82, at 14; Patterson
Thuente, supra note 82, at 23.
101 Digital Control, Inc. v. The Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (articulating "the subjective 'but for' test, where the misrepresentation actually
caused the examiner to approve the patent application when he would not otherwise have
done so").
102
See generally supra note 94.
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The Rule 56 standard solves all of these problems. It's
articulated precisely in the regulation, it is determinable ex ante at
the time of prosecution, and it presents no Catch-22 (because the
applicant still has room to argue around the prior art).
Moving to the element of intent, I want to focus on two
particular issues. First, it strikes me that a big part of the reason
that intent is such a mess right now is because the concepts of
"gross negligence" and "should have known" are so subjective,
vague and standardless that it's nearly impossible to apply them
rigorously and consistently across cases, and to base one's conduct
on them. I fear that moving to a "specific intent" standard will
simply perpetuate this problem, with a new ambiguous standard.
That is why I favor both the "single most reasonable inference"
test from Star Scientific,10 3 plus the approach taken in the IP Law
Professors' brief of enumerating specific factual proofs that can
add up to clear and convincing evidence of intent. 104
Another problem with intent, from the perspective of patent
prosecutors, arises from the current burden-shifting scheme, where
patent prosecutors are asked to provide credible (and detailed)
good faith explanations for why they didn't disclose the
information to the examiner.1 05 Quite often, the (non)disclosure
will be something that occurred five or ten years earlier, and the
prosecutor will simply have no recollection as to why the
information was not disclosed. However, being subjected to a
burden of coming forward with a good explanation, the prosecutor
will do her best to reconstruct an explanation. When, as often
happens, the reconstructed explanation is imperfect, those
imperfections then become a basis to doubt the prosecutor's
credibility, which in turn supports a finding of deceptive intent. 106
The burdens of proof and production for all elements of the
inequitable conduct defense should always remain with the party
who is asserting the defense.

103

Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir.

2008).
104

IP Law Professors, supra note 83.

106

See, e.g., 22 Patent Prosecution Firms, supra note 82.

105 See, e.g., 22 Patent Prosecution Firms, supra note 82, at 6-8.
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Finally, purely apart from the substantive law questions of
materiality and intent is the very important issue of the impact of
inequitable conduct allegations on the careers and reputations of
patent prosecution counsel. The amicus briefs of 22 Patent
Prosecution Firms and Practitioners and 43 Patent Practitioners
Employed by Eli Lilly provide a detailed narrative of this problem
for patent prosecution counsel. 0 7 In Exergen, the court recognized
that the kind of particularized pleading that is required under Rule
9(b) may require that a pleading be filed under seal to protect the
reputation of individuals accused of inequitable conduct. 0 8 And,
indeed, that is the very problem that started this whole discussion.
In 1988, in Burlington's declaration of plague, the court continued,
Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled to make
the charge against other reputable lawyers on the
slenderest grounds, to represent their client's
interests adequately, perhaps. They get anywhere
with the accusation in but a small percentage of the
cases, but such charges are not inconsequential on
that account. They destroy the respect for one
another's integrity, for being fellow members of an
honorable profession, that used to make the bar a
valuable help to the courts in making a sound
disposition of their cases, and to sustain the good
name of the bar itself.109
Yet at the same time, the Federal Circuit has ruled that patent
prosecution counsel, as a non-party, lacks standing to challenge a
ruling that he has committed inequitable conduct. 0 Similarly, in
the Therasense case itself, the attorney accused of inequitable
conduct tried repeatedly to intervene and was denied."' As he so
22 Patent Prosecution Firms, supra note 82; 43 Eli Lilly Patent Practitioners, supra
note 82.
108 Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1329 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
109 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
110 Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys., Inc., 497 F.3d 1316, 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1 Lawrence S. Pope's Motion for Leave to Intervene on Appeal Therasense, Inc. v.
Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 20081511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595) [hereinafter Pope]; see also Defending Yourself in
Inequitable Conduct Proceedings, PATENTLY-O (May 18, 2010, 4:10 PM),
107
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poignantly testified in his declaration accompanying his motion to
intervene, this ruling has had a serious negative impact on his
career.1 12
Now I recognize that giving prosecution counsel full rights to
intervene might be a messy solution. Prosecution counsel may
disagree with litigation counsel about the prior art, or how the
claims should be construed-in relation to the prior art. There
might be unmanageable conflicts of interest, and significant
pressures on the sanctity of attorney-client duties of loyalty and
confidentiality. But to simply deny that prosecution counsel has
standing strikes me as overly formalistic and harmful.
CONCLUSION

The inequitable conduct doctrine is an important doctrine, and
it is long overdue for a significant revision by the Federal Circuit
sitting en banc. The court's answers to the six questions it posed in
the en banc Order in Therasense will go a long way to rationalizing
and updating the doctrine. Additionally, the heightened pleading
standard announced in Exergen should be expected to have a major
impact on the rate at which inequitable conduct is raised in
litigation. Finally, as we continue the ongoing dialogue about the
inequitable conduct defense, I urge you to be mindful of the
doctrine from the perspective of patent prosecution counsel-how
can we provide a standard that best enables them to do the right
thing during prosecution, and when they are accused of inequitable
conduct, what due process should be afforded to them?
POSTSCRIPT

On May 25, 2011, the Federal Circuit issued its en banc ruling
in Therasense.113 A total of six judges joined the majority opinion,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/05/defending-yourself-in-inequitable-conductproceedings.html (describing the actions of petitioner attorney in Therasense).
112 See Pope, supra note 11l, at 2-3; see also Defending
Yourself in Inequitable
Conduct Proceedings,supra note 111.
"
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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authored by Chief Judge Rader. The majority adopted a but-forplus test for materiality. Under the majority's test, information is
material if but-for the nondisclosure the claim would not have
issued, or the applicant engaged in "affirmative egregious
misconduct."1 14 The majority adopted a requirement of "specific
intent,""'5 which it held could be proved by evidence that the
applicant (a) knew of the prior art, (b) knew of its materiality, and
The
(c) made a decision not to disclose it to the USPTO.11
majority also required that, when circumstantial evidence is used to
prove intent, a deceptive intent must be the "single most
reasonable inference," following Judge Michel's opinion in Star
Scientific." 7 Finally, the majority held that proof of intent must be
independent of proof of materiality" 8 (though it is unclear whether
or not there can be some overlapping proofs of intent and
materiality, so long as there is also independent evidence of intent).
Judge Bryson and three others dissented, arguing for deference to
the USPTO on the materiality standard-but further arguing that
the "reasonable examiner" standard is no different from the 1992
version of Rule 56.119 Judge O'Malley dissented separately to
argue that, because inequitable conduct is an equitable doctrine,
neither the materiality standard nor the remedy should be limited
by bright-line rules, and that both should be broadly open to the
trial judge's discretion.120 Both dissenting opinions agreed with
the majority concerning the intent element. On July 21, 2011, the
USPTO published a proposed rulemaking that would amend Rule
56 to adopt the Therasense majority's position.12 1
114 Id. at 1074.

115 Id at 1072.
116 Id These evidentiary requirements parallel the proposal made in the Intellectual
Property Law Professors' amicus brief. See IP Law Professors, supra note 83, at 20.
1"
Therasense, 99 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1073 (quoting Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
"' Id at ("[A] district court may not infer intent solely from materiality. Instead, a
court must weigh the evidence of intent to deceive independent of its analysis of
materiality. Proving that the applicant knew of a reference, should have known of its
materiality, and decided not to submit it to the PTO does not prove specific intent to
deceive.").
119 Id at 1088-91 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
120 Id at 1079 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
121 76 Fed. Reg. 43634 (July 21, 2011).
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